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TRADE RESTRAINTS - AssocIATioNs OF MANUFACTURERS TO CoMBAT
STYLE PIRACY - ILLEGAL RESTRAINTS OF TRADE - In order to combat the
practice of "style piracy" among competitors, a large number of producers of
women's coats and dresses formed an association, whose membership was composed of designers, manufacturers, and distributors. Producers adjudged copyists
by the association were not permitted membership. The clear purpose of the
association was primarily to boycott retailers 1 who refused to deal solely with

1 "As a result of their [ the guild's] efforts, approximately I 2,000 retailers
throughout the country have signed agreements to 'cooperate' with the Guild's boycott
program, but more than half of these signed the agreements only because constrained
by threats that Guild members would not sell to retailers who failed to yield to their
demands-threats that have been carried out..•." Principal case, 61 S. Ct. 703 at 705.
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members of the association, and secondarily to boycott, and eliminate competition from, the copyists. In addition there was provided a system of registration
for designs made by members, and a judicial type of machinery for protecting
the designers' interest therein. The association further limited the business activities of its members through, among other things, 2 restrictions on their participation in retail advertising and their retail sales, and on the discounts which they
might allow. On essentially these findings,8 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's approval of the Federal Trade Commission's cease and desist order. 4 Held, by unanimous·decision of the Supreme
Court on certiorari,5 that the practices of the association constituted unfair
methods of competition and were illegal under the Federal Trade Commission,°
Clayton,7 and Sherman Anti-Trust Acts. 8 Fashion. Originators' Guild of
America v. Federal Trade Commission, (U.S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 703.
Producers of women's clothing who maintain departments for the development of novel designs for their products, and independent designers, have found
that other clothing manufacturers can purchase on the market garments embodying these novelties, copy them, produce them in volume, and drastically
undersell the "creators." 9 They have found that the vast majority of their
2 Justice Black also refers in the opinion to the combination's cooperation "with
local guilds in regulating days upon which special sales shall be held"; to prohibitions
against its members' "selling women's garments to persons who conduct businesses in
:i:_esidences, residential quarters, hotels or apartment houses"; and to its denial of "the
benefits of membership to retailers who participate with dress manufacturers in promoting fashion shows unless the merchandise used is actually purchased and delivered."
Principal case, 61 S. Ct. 703 at 706.
8
In Millinery Creators' Guild v. Federal Trade Commission, (U. S. 1941) 61
S. Ct. 708, decided the same day on the basis of the principal case, the Court found
essentially the same fact situation as in the principal case, and yet there was in that
case no affiliation with textile manufacturers, converters, or dyers. See the opinion of
the circuit court, (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) 109 F. (2d) 175. From this it may be con•
cluded that the presence of this affiliation as found in the principal case had no major
effect upon the decision there reached.
4
Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. Federal Trade Commission, (C. C. A.
2d, 1940) II4 F. (2d) So.
11
Certiorari was granted in the Fashion Originators' Guild case and the Millinery
Creators' Guild case because of the inconsistency between the holdings of the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit [notes 3 and 4, supra; also see Esterlee Frocks v.
Fashion Originators' Guild of America, (D. C. N. Y. 1940) 3 C. C.H. FED. TRADE
REc. SERVICE, 1T 25,464] and the holding of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit in William Filene's Sons Co. v. Fashion Originators' Guild of America,
(C. C. A. 1st, 1937) 90 F. (2d) 556.
6
38 Stat. L. 717 (1914), 15 U.S. C. (1935), §§ 41 et seq.
7
38 Stat. L. 730 (1914), 15 U.S. C. (1935), §§ 12 et seq.
8
26 Stat. L. 209 (1890), l 5 U.S. C. (1935), §§ I et seq.
9
Excellent general discussions of the practical and legal problems raised by style
piracy may be found in Callmann, "Style and Design Piracy," 22 J. PAT. OFFICE
Soc. 557 (1940), and Chafee, "Unfair Competition," 53 HARV. L. REv. 1289
(1940). Both articles conclude that the only real solution to the problem is some form
of legislative action. OPPENHEIM, CAsES ON TRADE REGULATIONS 394 (1936), contains a note on recent proposals to Congress.
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designs cannot be patented under the design patent statute, for the reason that
the requirement of originality is too strict,10 And they have further found that
they cannot get protection by injunction.11 In a final effort to protect their
interests in the designs and in their exclusive markets, the producers and designers have resorted to self-help in the form of guilds such as those described in
the principal case.12 In reaching a decision that the Fashion Originators' Guild
and the Millinery Creators' Guild constitute an illegal restraint of trade, the
Court might have chosen any one of several theories as determinative of the
question; but rather than restrict its holding, it bases its conclusion on several
grounds.18 (I) It finds that the restrictive sales, upon which the scheme of the
guilds was founded, are illegal, under section 3 0£ the Clayton Act. ( 2) It also
finds illegal, under section I of the Sherman Act, the narrowing of the markets
to which manufacturers can sell and from which retailers can buy,14 the subjecting of producers and retailers to organized boycott,15 the requirement of the
guilds that members "reveal to the Guild the intimate details of their individual affairs," and also the guilds' "direct suppression of competition" 16 by
copyists. (3) Further still, the Court finds that "the combination is in reality
an extra-governmental agency, which prescribes rules for the regulation and
restraint of interstate commerce, and provides extra-judicial tribunals for determination and punishment of violations, and thus 'trenches upon the power
of the national legislature and violates the statute,'" 17 Under section 2 of the
Sherman Act, the Court, conceding that the guilds may not yet be complete
monopolies, finds that they tended to become monopolies, thus operated to deprive
the public of the advantages of free competition, and were therefore violative
10 See Callmann, "Style and Design Piracy," 22 J. PAT. OFFICE Soc. 557 (1940);
see also Margolis v. National Bellas Hess Co., 139 Misc. 738, 249 N. Y. S. 175
( I 93 I), discussing the defects of the copyright statute as to designs.
1 :1. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., (C. C. A. 2d, 1929) 35 F. (2d) 279. See
also Chafee, "Unfair Competition," 53 HARV, L. REv. 1289 (1940) for a multitude
of reasons why an injunction should not issue.
12 See 49 YALE L. J. 1290 (1940); also a discussion of truthful defamation as
an alternative remedy in 40 CoL. L. REV. 736 (1940). Esterlee Frocks v. Fashion
Originators' Guild of America, (D. C. N. Y. 1940) 3 C. C. H. FEo. TRADE REG.
SERVICE, 1f 25,464, suggests the possibility of this alternative self-help remedy.
18 The body of the opinion contains specific references to and citations of 14
different cases.
14 Citing Montagne & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38, 24 S. Ct. 307 (1903).
15 Citing Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Assn. v. United States, 234 U. S.
600, 34 S. Ct. 951 (1914), which held that the circulation by an association of retailers
of reports on listed wholesalers which tended to prevent association members from
dealing with the reported wholesalers was an unreasonable and direct restraint of trade
within the meaning of the Sherman Act. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 28 S. Ct.
301 ( 1908), is particularly in point here, but the failure to cite it may be explained in
part by note 23, infra.
16 61 S. Ct. 703 at 707, citing United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262
U. S. 371, 43 S. Ct. 607 (1923).
17 61 S. Ct. 703 at 707, citing Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175
U. S. 2II, 20 S. Ct. 96 (1899).
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of its provisions.18 Justice Black, speaking for the Court, lays emphasis upon two
points in particular. He says that "While a conspiracy to fix prices is illegal, an
intent to increase prices is not an ever-present essential of conduct amounting
to a violation of the policy of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.•.." 19 In support
of this proposition, obvious enough in itself, Justice Black relies upon a statement
in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association,20 a fact which may
show a tendency of the Court to return to a still stricter application of the
Sherman Act. 21 The opinion next points out that no trade abuse can justify a
combination, the aim of which is the "destruction of one type of manufacture
and sale which competed with Guild members." 22 Whether reference is here
made to the boycott elements of the combination is certainly doubtful, and it
may be that the Court's previous attitude, inclining to the conclusion that a
boycott is illegal per se, is here being extended to certain restraints of trade other
than price fixing.23 If this change in attitude in fact exists, it would seem to indi18

The proposition that a monopoly is sufficiently found if a combination "tends
to that end and to deprive the public of the advantages which fl.ow from free competition" was set forth in United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S.. I at 16, 15
S. Ct. 249 (1895).
.
19
61 S. Ct. 703 at 707.
20 166 U.S. 290 at 341, 342, 17 S. Ct. 540 (1897), which held that a combination, the purpose of which was " 'mutual protection by establishing and maintaining
reasonable rates, rules and regulations on all freight traffic, both through and local' "
had, in operation, the "direct, immediate, and necessary effect" of putting a restraint
upon commerce, and that any combination having such effect was illegal. Cf. Standard
Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 31 S. Ct. 502 (1911), for the
decision establishing the unreasonableness requirement for illegality.
21 In view of the fact that the Court here relies on the old Trans-Missouri Freight
Assn. test (see note 20, supra) and that it repeatedly emphasizes the illegality of the
suppression of competition without any showing of an intent to fix prices or even a
direct effect upon prices of the associations in the principal case, it may be that the
principal case indicates an inclination of the Court to consider illegal any combination
of producers which effects a suppression of competition.
22
61 S. Ct. 703 at 708.
28
Boycotts, in that they restrain a lawful right of free access to markets, have met
with the Court's disfavor almost from the time of the first enactment of the Sherman
Act. From the commercial boycott of Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38, 24
S. Ct. 307 (1903), through the labor boycott of Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 28
S. Ct. 301 (1908), to the boycotts found in Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United
States, 282 U. S. 30, 51 S. Ct. 42 (1930), and Vitagraph v. Perelman, (C. C. A.
3d, 1938) 95 F. (2d) 142, concerted trade restraints of this nature have been held
illegal. Although Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority of the Court in United
States v. Hutcheson, (U. S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 463, points out that boycotts by labor in
employer-employee disputes are no longer illegal under the federal anti-trust laws, still
the exception expressly applies only to labor activities. For practical purposes boycotts
organized by the concerted action of manufacturers may be considered illegal per se on
the strength of repeated holdings of illegality when they are involved. In general, as
pointed out in the circuit court opinion in Fashion Originators' Guild of America
v. Federal Trade Commission, (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) 114 F. (2d) 80, the reasons given
for so holding are the danger of allowing private parties to adjudicate another's wrongs,
the danger of a boycott's leading to monopoly, and the difficulty a court or administra-
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cate a definite departure from the test of reasonableness which has long been
used as the basis for finding a violation of the anti-trust laws. At any rate, the
finding that the guilds were engaged in boycotting their competitors, regardless
of any justification which might have been claimed on the grounds of reasonable method or the need for self-protection, was undoubtedly of itself sufficient
to support a conclusion of illegality.24 Nevertheless, the Court finds in addition
that "The purpose and object of this combination, its potential power, its
tendency to monopoly, the coercion it could and did practice upon a rival
method of competition" 25 were all unlawful objects such as would preclude
the admission of evidence of the reasonableness of the methods used.

tive tribunal would have in controlling or preventing an unjust use of it. Any combination which effects a suppression of competition would be vulnerable to the second
two arguments. Thus, again, considering all the circumstances, the Court may here
be holding that a combination of manufacturers which effects a suppression of competition is illegal per se.
u Cf. note 23, supra, in so far as it sets forth the proposition that, in other hands
than labor's, a concerted boycott is illegal by virtue of its very object.
25 Principal case, 61 S. Ct. 703 at 708.

